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too redundant. The instances cited are so numerous and confusing that they obscure the main idea. As a German proverb says, "The trees hide the forest."

E. BOIRAC.

L'ANNÉE PHILOSOPHIQUE. Par F. Pillon. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1893.

M. Pillon, with his teacher M. Renouvier, was one of the founders of Neo-Kantianism in France. For nearly twenty years they both applied the principles of their philosophy to all questions, moral, social, political, religious, literary, scientific, etc., in a valiant little weekly review, *La Critique philosophique*, to which they were almost the only contributors. Since this review ceased to appear, M. Pillon has in some degree replaced it by a sort of annual inventory of all the most recent philosophical publications in France, of which he has now given us the third volume under the title "L'Année philosophique." In it we find an interesting essay upon Schopenhauer and the "Metaphysics of Pessimism," by M. Renouvier; an original study by M. Dauriac on "The Nature of Emotion," in which he improves and very happily completes the well-known theory of William James; and finally a very learned exposition of the "Historical Evolution of Idealism, from Democritus to Locke," by M. Pillon. This is followed by a bibliography of French philosophy for the year 1892, which is a review by M. Pillon of all the works, large or small, that appeared in France during that year which could be of interest to philosophical students. They are arranged under the following headings: 1, metaphysics, psychology, and philosophy of science; 2, ethics, religious philosophy, and æsthetics; 3, philosophy of history, sociology, and pedagogy; 4, history of philosophy and criticism. These are all examined from the Neo-Kantian point of view.

E. BOIRAC.

DARWIN AND HEGEL. By D. G. Ritchie. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. Pp. xvi, 285.

The most obvious objection to these essays is their scrappiness. To get a system out of them is (if I may quote Mr. Ritchie against himself) "like trying to make your dinner off shrimps." But this is an objection which no one will care to urge in the face of Mr. Ritchie's own admission. He claims for them only the unity of stand-point. He is an Evolutionary Idealist, and these essays

are an attempt to reconcile the two aspects of his faith. Though calling itself an eirenicon, the book is largely polemical. Part of the polemic is directed against the evolutionists, part against certain recent critics of Hegel.

Mr. Ritchie accepts evolution in its entirety as an account of how things have come to be as they are. But the ordinary evolutionist thinks his theory a "universal pick-lock," as Scott says of the association of ideas in his day; he claims to have driven philosophy quite off the field. Mr. Ritchie is at pains to show that there are certain regions of inquiry, both before and after, which evolution does not, and by its very nature cannot, touch. *First*, there is the previous question, the critical or transcendental inquiry, "How is this process possible?" Here Mr. Ritchie's statement of the Kantian position shows how much he has been affected by Aristotle. The essentially analytic nature of the transcendental method is brought out when it is put as follows: "If knowledge be altogether dependent on sensation, knowledge is impossible. But knowledge is possible, because the sciences exist. Therefore, etc." Taking his stand on this non-sensational element, Mr. Ritchie goes on to point out, *secondly*, that there is a further region of inquiry which no historical theory can cover. This is the region of the regulative sciences of logic, ethics, æsthetics, and politics. These sciences deal not with what is, but with what ought to be. This "ought to be" is possible only because of the non-sensational element which criticism has discovered in knowledge, the "timeless self," which constantly presents to us ideals of consistency, goodness, and beauty. The actual content of these ideals will vary with time, place, and person; but their presence is implied in all reasoning, all conduct, and all art.

In the second half of the volume Mr. Ritchie develops some of the practical consequences of this position. His main object is to combat the *laissez faire* view, which is taken to be the legitimate outcome of natural selection, and in its stead to rehabilitate (in Aristotelian phrase) the conception of the Final Cause as a working concept in politics. He maintains that with the appearance of reflection the cruel operation of natural selection should give way to rational selection, the conflict of forces being transmuted into a conflict of ideas, which are at first (and to this day) embodied in opposing parties, but may ultimately come to have their battle-ground within the individual. Then the dialectical movement of selection will go on within the soul itself.

The little essay on the Rights of Minorities is a good example of the way in which Mr. Ritchie applies these ideas to politics. "The all-important and essential right of minorities," he says, "is the right to turn themselves into majorities if they can. This means freedom of the press, freedom of association, freedom of public meeting." Given these things,—and they are given wherever there is a fairly representative government and a sound public opinion,—then, if the idea which the minority has got hold of be a vital one, it will form a new and fruitful variation which is bound to succeed; if the idea be a mere survival, to protect it is simply to establish a drain upon the strength of the body politic. But when a fair chance is not given for the new variations to justify themselves by success, it may become the *duty* of the minority to suffer for their cause. It is amusing to observe how exactly Mr. Ritchie has been anticipated by that arch-Tory, Dr. Johnson: "In short, sir, I have got no farther than this: every man has a right to utter what he thinks truth, and every other man has a right to knock him down for it. Martyrdom is the test."

In the essay on "Darwin and Hegel," Mr. Ritchie applies the doctrine of natural selection to resolve certain difficulties in Hegel's philosophy of nature. This essay, like the next, is largely a defence of Hegel against Professor Seth. Professor Seth accuses Hegel of "a most transparent fallacy" in making the contingent a category. "To say that a thing is contingent," he argues, "is to say in so many words that we can give no rational account of why it is as it is and not otherwise." Here Mr. Ritchie comes to the rescue with the doctrine of natural selection. The apparent non-rationality of nature is seen to be only that indefinite variability which natural selection presupposes: the connection between the qualities of things is seen to be no longer casual, but to exist because it has in some way helped them in the struggle for existence. This is very true, but is hardly a fair answer to Professor Seth. Science has given us a new conception, which explains the apparently contingent in some cases, and shows us how it may be explicable in all. But Hegel, as Mr. Ritchie admits, knew nothing about natural selection. Why then give him the benefit of it? Hegel's "transparent fallacy" consists in taking the contingent *as it stands* and classing it without scientific mediation as a form of the idea. This is against his own view of philosophy, which can take its material only after the special sciences have done their work. Here was a gap in his science: it cannot be stopped by

philosophy. His justification, of course, lies in his invincible conviction that there is nothing ultimately irrational in the universe.

Again, on the subject of personality, we find Mr. Ritchie championing Hegel against Professor Seth; and again, I think, he fails to do justice to his opponent's position. That position he nicknames "animated atomism," and dismisses as a pretty speculation, grounded upon the popular *Vorstellung* of a spiritual substance. But is Mr. Ritchie so sure that his own position is not grounded on another *Vorstellung?* At least, it has been too long presented to English readers in that guise; and on the whole I believe that though Professor Seth may not have made out his case against Hegelianism, he has made it out against Green. He has laid his finger on the "sublime fallacy" by which Green passes from the mere unity of apperception, the universal type of consciousness, to the conception of a universal consciousness, arguing, as it were, from synonym to subject. What makes the transition plausible is the *Vorstellung* of organism,—a useful conception, but it has become *crambe repetita* to the present generation, and they begin to ask whether its value is not exhausted. Is it the last word in philosophy? Does it give final expression to the relation between God and man? Even if Professor Seth's views are reactionary, we owe him thanks for reopening the question. The strength of his position lies in the strength of the conviction to which he appeals,—the conviction, I mean, that personalities have worth as ends in themselves. If Mr. Ritchie does not feel this conviction in all its force, it is perhaps because of his too exclusive attention to politics. There the individual counts for nothing as against the state. But what transmutes social compulsion into *moral* obligation is precisely the interest which the individual has in the common good as his good. If we co-operate with God on any other terms, "then are we bastards and not sons." Mr. Ritchie, worshipping a God "realized in a society which is a spiritual body" (the old metaphor!), does not attempt to answer that question of Professor Seth's which has found an echo in so many hearts,—"What of those who have fallen by the way, who have died not having received the promises?"

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